| 期刊詳細資料 Journal detailed information |
| 作者(Author) | 曾明遜、陳明燦 |
| 篇名(Article title) | 預售屋不實廣告責任之法律經濟分析 |
| 期刊名(Journal name) | 公平交易季刊 |
| 國際期刊(International Journal) | TSSCI |
| 中文摘要(Abstrct) | 預售屋真實廣告雖具有降低資訊蒐尋成本的經濟功效，惟在社會資本相對薄弱的現代社會中，常會出現預售屋廣告的機會主義者利用資訊的優勢，將成本外部化給購屋者。為了讓交易者享受合作且競爭交易活動所帶來的好處，宜有適宜的法制，來降低不實廣告所引發的交易成本。本文利用法律經濟研究途徑，探討預售屋不實廣告的責任法制規範。對於責任法制分析，法律經濟學者常引用「Hand法則」來詮釋，然常忽略被確認為違約者與受害者提起訴訟的機率問題。若將此機率問題納入Hand法則，我們將可發現未來社會發展將相對有更多的防免行為，更少過失或故意的不實廣告損害行為，惟實際效果仍有待實務的驗證。此外，在賣方無過失，而買方有過失時，採賣方「過失責任」比賣方「無過失責任」，較易達到最低社會成本狀態。在買賣雙方皆有過失，而且買方過失比賣方過失大（小）時，採買方「與有過失責任」，將比僅採賣方「過失責任」或「無過失責任」較易（不易）達到最低社會成本狀態。 |
| ABSTRCT | True advertising activities in the pre-sales housing market can reduce information search costs, while deceptive or misleading ones will increase enforcement costs. In order to reduce the transaction costs of false advertising activities, policy-makers must seek to effective regulatory instruments to correct externalities arising from opportunism. This paper adopts an approach based on law and economics that incorporates the “Learned Hand Rule” under uncertainty to discuss which liability rule can induce the potential injurer to internalize the expected social damages and thus make optimal precautions. This paper shows that the injurer’s negligence rule with a defense of contributory negligence, under the victim’s contribution to his negligence is greater than that of the injurer, provides more efficient incentives for minimizing the social costs of transactions than a simple strict liability rule. |
| 中文關鍵字(Keyword) | 不實廣告、交易成本、法律經濟、Hand法則、責任法制 |
| KEYWORD | Deceptive or Misleading Advertising, Transaction Costs, Law and Economics, Learned Hand Rule, Liability Rule. |
| 卷期(Volume No) | 第14卷 第3期 |
| 頁數(Page number) | 第1~25頁 |
| 年份(Year) | 2006 |
| 語言(Language) | 中文 Chinese |